Like modern economic and political cycles, many disintegrations have been quasi-periodic. China is an example. Its dynasties sometimes fell as a result of how its rulers dealt with recurrent ®nancial crises (Yu-Chuan, 1936; Olson, 1982; Skinner, 1985) . When a Chinese emperor needed money to address an immediate problem, he would sell perpetual tax abatements for large lump sum payments. This kept the dynasty in power in the short run, but eventually transferred so much tax burden to the peasants that they rebelled, a new ruler was then given the Mandate of Heaven, and the cycle began anew. The Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun (1377) advanced a similar economic argument to explain why most Arab dynasties fell after a few generations. The same view has been used to explain the decline of the Roman, Spanish, Ottoman and other empires that`overtaxed' their citizens. Nevertheless, such an economic or over-bureaucratization argument is just one of many theories about collapse.
So far, our assumption has been that clear cause-and-effect relationships would become obvious when enough data were collected about societal collapses, but rather than speaking unambiguously, Clio, the Muse of history, seems to be have been mumbling when she talked about collapses. The odd thing about studying societal and semi-societal collapses is that cause-and-effect relationships usually are not clear. Some societies, such as the monumental statue builders of Easter Island, vanished quickly without leaving many clues about their demise. For others the evidence is extensive, but can be used to support many different theories. An example is the debate over the cause of the Classic Maya Lowland collapse of the ninth century.
As David Phillips (1979: 140) has noted about our intellectual dilemma,`In a sense, the problem is not that states collapse (for this happens constantly), but rather that some states last so long'. In trying to reconcile the core arguments of the various theories, Tainter (1995) concluded that the reason societies collapse is because as they`mature', it becomes more costly for them to ®nd solutions to their problems. While Tainter and the life-cycle theorists have captured the qualitative nature of societal collapses, I believe that its essence lies more deeply in a quanti®able`universal regularity' that affects all societies ± not just the mature ones.
The relatively new perspectives of self-organization and nonlinear causation suggest that we have been asking Clio the wrong sorts of questions, which is why we have not been getting clear answers. These new perspectives suggest that few ± if any ± collective human processes have stable solutions in the long run. Instead, they exist at the`edge of chaos' where catastrophic and unexpected events occasionally occur that strongly shape a society's evolution. Seen from this viewpoint, all societal collapses and most minor calamities are examples of a quanti®able and very general sort of process, which also`causes' riots, biological plagues and wild®res; the collapse of governing coalitions, voting landslides and market crashes; avalanches, technological disasters, earthquakes and wars, ad in®nitum.
Virtually all aggregate-level, monumental events are somehow`caused' by the process of self-organized criticality. While this newly discovered process constitutes a`universal regularity' that is easy to document in many physical systems, some of its negative effects on societies have been moderated by the advancement of civilization. Human efforts to dampen its complexity cascades have made it hard to recognize self-organized criticality in most social, economic and political processes. This is why ®nding Clio's`engine of history' has remained such an elusive goal.
My purpose is to advance a general, quanti®able theory of the collapse of societies that is based on self-organized criticality. More speci®cally, I hypothesize that weak self-organized criticality is ubiquitous in human systems. If this conjecture is correct, it not only explains the source of total societal collapses, but the pattern of most other sorts of human calamities, and even the frequency distribution of many mundane day-to-day events.
Some Introductory Comments
The concepts of fractals and nonlinear time series are unfamiliar to most social scientists, and this branch of mathematics has had to coin a number of terms to describe its new ideas. Unfortunately, some of the most important of these terms already had well-established meanings in social science, or were being used in a multitude of ways by other disciplines. This makes translating' many nonlinear ideas dif®cult, particularly since there is no consensus as yet on the preferred de®nition of many important terms (Brunk, 2000) .
The most obvious example of a common term in the social sciences that has been given a new meaning is`nonlinear'. It used to be that mathematicians, physicists and social scientists all used it in the same way. A nonlinear equation was a curve, such as Y a bX bX 2 . Today, a nonlinear time series is de®ned as one that exhibits sudden discontinuities. It is everywhere continuous, but nowhere differentiable, and so the future behavior of such a series cannot accurately be predicated with any of our traditional statistical techniques.
Such a confusion in terminology is typical of the historical development of new ideas in the physical sciences, and also can be seen in political science writings from the beginning of the behavioral revolution. At ®rst, many important concepts of behavioral analysis could only be intuited ± not precisely de®ned. In the literature on nonlinear dynamics, the current imprecision is re¯ected in a number of intellectual annoyances. Concepts often are discussed by citing examples and analogies, rather than precise mathematical formulae because exact relationships have yet to be worked out. Benoit Mandelbrot's well-known writings re¯ect these trends. Misstatements also are common. Particularly in the literature on chaotic dynamics, writers make seemingly self-obvious claims that eventually are shown not to be true. 1 Some terms are used in a multitude of ways, but most writers are not aware that this is happening, either, and so they talk past each other.
2 The fundamental concept of`complexity' is an excellent example (Horgan, 1995; Brunk, 2000) . A system can grow and become more complex in numerous ways. It can simply become larger. It can become composed of more subsystems of about equal in¯uence. It can accumulate more connections among its parts. It can develop more specialized subsystems and a means of coordinating them, etc.`Complexity cascade' and`self-organization' are two others. These terms also have been used by some political scientists, but not in the same way as they are used in the physics literature.
If a concept is of crucial importance to the following discussion, I will provide as precise a de®nition possible given our current understanding of such matters. If a concept is not as central to the presentation, I will only describe its contours, and let interested readers consult the immense literature in other disciplines on these matters, with the caveat that lots of contradictions and fuzzy claims exist regarding the sorts of problems that we address as social scientists. This is because these problems are not central to the interests of mathematicians and physicists.
This also is why the ®eld of applied nonlinear dynamics is ripe for research by social scientists. If I was a graduate student looking for a wide open area of intellectual inquiry, this is what I would investigate. Unlike much of contemporary social science, which is tied to particular orthodoxies and whosè sects and cults' believe they already have`found the truth', many of thè really big' questions about nonlinear dynamics have yet to be addressed in 198 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2)
1. One example in political science is the mis-statement that ®nding a pattern in a phase plot implies that a time series is chaotic; it only indicates that a cyclical or quasi-cyclical pattern exists. That pattern might be caused by multiple cycles of the sort that generate ice ages. In economics a number of claims about statistical techniques seem to be wrong. For example, econometric`tests for chaos' are just general tests for nonlinear dynamics, but when they were developed it was not known that SOC is a second sort of nonlinear dynamical process. So many of the economists who a decade ago believed that they had documented chaos in empirical data probably had discovered SOC instead.
2. When they suddenly become aware of their differences, the result can be dramatic. Waldrop (1992: Ch. 4 ) recounts an early conference on nonlinear dynamics that was attended by physicists and economists, and noted that such meetings sometimes`degenerated into shouting matches and sulking' (p. 143). a satisfactory manner. For that matter, we are not even sure what many of these questions might be.
Chaos
Today, two types of nonlinear dynamical processes are recognized: chaos and the more recently discovered self-organized criticality (SOC). A number of political scientists are interested in chaos theory, and quite a few readable introductions to this literature have been written from a social science perspective (e.g. Brown, 1994 Brown, , 1995a Kiel and Elliott, 1996) . The same cannot be said for self-organized criticality (see Brunk, 2001) .
Chaos is a deterministic nonlinear process that can shift the behavior of a system among a multitude of dynamic states without warning. This is why, by de®nition, chaotic systems are governed by nonlinear dynamics. A simple physical example of a chaotic system is a magnetic pendulum swinging above another magnet. In so doing it traces out both three-dimensional and time series patterns (Packard et al., 1980) . Measuring one of them allows you to infer the other. Sometimes the magnetic pendulum swings as a normal pendulum. Sometimes it swings in repeating simple or multiple cycles, and sometimes it shifts into a dynamic path that never exactly repeats, but has bounded values and is precisely predictable given enough information about past behavior. This latter state is called`chaotic'; and it is what produces the Mandelbot plots of contemporary art.
Any particular chaotic function is a member of an in®nite family of functions, which can produce very different patterns of discontinuities in real world data. We have been using chaotic functions for years, but most of us did not recognize them. The`random numbers' of the last generation of mainframe computers and many of today's handheld calculators are generated by a type of chaotic function. Any time series of`random numbers' created in this way is completely deterministic and can be reproduced as the same sequence over and over again. This means that`randomness' is not the obvious and easy to understand concept that most of us have assumed (Kolata, 1986; Savit, 1988) .
While chaos does not generate unique equilibria, economists realize that if the world must be viewed as a nonlinear environment, at least seeing it as chaotic retains the possibility of ®nding deterministic outcomes. So the economists who have been interested in nonlinear dynamics have spent a great deal of time studying the properties of chaotic systems. Nevertheless, they have not been able to identify the parameters of any chaotic economic system using real world data, which casts grave doubts about whether chaos is the nonlinear dynamic that generates most discontinuities in human time series.
Contemporary Puzzles
Traditional historians and pre-behavioral social scientists saw the world from a quite different perspective. We used to`see' big events, and much of our literature dealt with models that tried to explain them, such as the numerous works on electoral`cycles' in American presidential elections. The behavioral revolution had the unanticipated effect of changing how social scientists viewed causation. More and more, we came to think of the world from the strictly linear paradigm of Y a bX. In such a world, the magnitude of an observed effect ÁY is a direct function of the change in X. So causation is thought to be relatively simple to infer.
Trying to explain sudden change is an important problem that has been a traditional focus of historiography, and has fascinated statisticians interested in evolutionary dynamics. Unfortunately, no category of empirical models has been notably successful in predicting the sudden changes that are ubiquitous in historical time series. Even the most sophisticated econometric techniques only are able ex post facto to estimate models that catch the timing of sudden past changes, but such models systematically underestimate their magnitudes.
The most common explanation for our failings is that we have committed à speci®cation error' by not including the correct explanatory variables in a model. Sure enough, if the variable that triggered the latest sudden event is included in an econometric model, the level of explained variance increases. Once again, we believe that we can predict the future, but after a while there is yet another serious model failure. Social science has seen this pattern repeated again and again, and slowly it is becoming apparent that there may be no light at the end of any tunnel that is built from the logic of linear causation (e.g. see Huckfeldt, 1990; Landes, 1994; Brown, 1995b) .
One of many examples of such paradigmatic problems concerns voting patterns. Many political scientists used to believe that there was an almost deterministic cycle of realigning elections (e.g. see Sundquist, 1973; Campbell and Trilling, 1980; Fenton, 1982) . A major problem with this perspective is that the US realignment predicted for the 1960s never happened. While more recent scholars have tried to forecast electoral outcomes well in advance, their voting predictions sometimes are way off the mark. This was painfully obvious at the 2000 Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association where every statistical model discussed at the panels predicted that Al Gore would be elected president with a substantial voting margin because of the excellent condition of the US economy.
What is even more perplexing about the general pattern of attempts at political and economic forecasting is that the proportion of missed forecasts is greater than should occur given the statistical prediction errors of our models. As is clear from the inaccuracy of projected government budget 200 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2) and other economic forecasts, our models often are somehow fundamentally wrong. Furthermore, when one of them mis-predicts, it often misses very badly.
Paradigm Shifts
Thomas Kuhn (1962) discussed a paradigm transition in the history of astronomy that has parallels to contemporary social science. The ancient astronomer Ptolemy popularized the view of the earth as the center of everything, and the planets were conceptualized as revolving around it on crystal spheres. While at ®rst both intuitively plausible and mathematically tractable, this explanation became cumbersome as an endless series of smaller spheres had to be superimposed on the primary one to get an earth-centered system's dynamics to correspond with increasingly better observations. Eventually, the Ptolemaic paradigm was rejected when the Copernican perspective that put the sun at the center of the solar system came to be seen as a more reasonable alternative. The earth could no longer be defended as the center of everything as soon as Galileo's telescope showed that Jupiter had moons. Then Newton demonstrated that parabolic orbits predicted planetary motions equally as well as a complicated mechanism of crystal spheres, and did so in a more satisfying way. In other words, in scholarly inquiry, new perspectives`win' as they incrementally come to be seen as more plausible representations of reality.
Today, there are many problems in social science research that cannot easily be addressed in a traditional linear manner. This suggests that something is fundamentally amiss. Why is it impossible to predict the really big events of history, but it is easy to predict the mundane ones? Why can statistical models ex post facto predict the timing of sudden changes, but almost always underestimate their magnitudes? Why do sophisticated econometric models with very high levels of explained variance fail to explain the timing of major changes? Why do outliers exist that are many standard deviations from the mean in aggregate-level historical data? Why is it necessary to increase the number of explanatory variables to retain the same level of statistically explained variance as the number of observations increases? Why do there appear to be deterministic cycles in historical data, but their deterministic nature slips from our grasp as our time series become longer or our observations become more accurate?
The recently developed nonlinear approach to modeling suggests that the reason we are unable to offer accurate predictions about most human events of great historical consequence is that our traditional notion of causation is incorrect. We have assumed that people operate in a linear world. In such a world, the magnitude of an effect is proportional to the magnitude of its cause. So when a big event occurs, we have assumed that it must have had a big cause. Accordingly, such diverse events as revolutions, political landslides and currency collapses are thought to result from tidal waves of historical processes. Certainly they could not have been the result of trivial events, and so all trivial events can be dismissed, out-of-hand, as a part of any general explanation of historical patterns.
In a linear world, the trivial always remains trivial, but in a nonlinear world, the magnitude of an effect is unrelated to the magnitude of its cause. A well-known meteorological example is that the¯apping of a buttery's wings in India can occasionally cause a thunderstorm in Kansas. If economic, political and social processes exist in such a nonlinear environment, minuscule causes sometimes will have large effects (Landes, 1994) .
So far, chaos theory has been the universal approach of choice among social scientists who are interested in nonlinear causation. Nevertheless, chaos has remained controversial even in economics, where it has many adherents. This is because chaotic explanations of historical behavior lack a certain intuitive plausibility. It is easy to show that chaotic nonlinear dynamics can occur if certain very speci®c conditions are met (e.g. Brown, 1994) , but doing so often seems to be little more than a mathematical trick that may not be related to any real world patterns. At the same time, it is equally as easy to demonstrate that most historical data series apparently contain nonlinear time dependencies, which means that they were generated by some nonlinear process. As we will see, adopting a self-organized criticality perspective on historical patterns resolves a variety of seemingly unrelated and long-standing problems in the social sciences.
Self-organizing Systems
Within the last few decades, the idea that the structure of complicated systems is more than just the result of random chance has become increasingly popular.
3 In biology the dominant intellectual puzzle was how complicated organisms could have developed in such a short time given the vast number of unsuccessful evolutionary mutations. A clue to solving that puzzle came from the hard sciences where geometrical patterns sometimes emerge spontaneously in chemical and physical reactions. The very simple processes that generate them produce self-similar or`fractal' patterns that 202 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 3. Since self-organization and complexity theory are unfamiliar topics to most social scientists, it is useful to note some relevant works. These include Anderson et al. (1988) , Artigiani (1991) , Engelen (1988) , Holland (1995 ), Jantsch (1980 , Kauffman (1991) , Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) , Sugden (1989) and Yates (1987). repeat both spatially and dynamically at different scales. A tree is a good example of such a fractal. Trees are more or less similar at numerous spatial scales, but no two trees are exactly alike. This is what is meant by being stochastically fractal. 4 The plausibility of spontaneous increases in the generic complexity of systems was strengthened when chemists discovered that some reactions are self-catalyzing. This means that a sequence of events produces byproducts that cause a reaction to increase in speed. The analogy in human systems is technological innovation. The greater the variety of`chemicals' in an environment and the higher the`temperature', the greater the likelihood that a self-catalyzing reaction will occur and in this way a system will evolve. Seeing that complicated patterns could emerge quickly, biologists realized that eyes and limbs are self-organizing features. Each new species does not have to independently evolve them because there is a master self-organizing process that propels organisms in this evolutionary direction when environmental circumstances advantage it.
Apparently there are a few very simple, generic processes that drive physical, biological and human systems toward ever increasing levels of complexity. An obvious example of such self-organization is societies, which quickly and independently evolve complicated patterns of social, economic and power relationships. While certain very general rules govern the behavior of all societies, the particular set of rules of each society is the product of a separate evolutionary sequence that operates within the con®nes of these more encompassing and generic rules.
The rules that simultaneously govern the development of different sorts of systems operate at a higher level than what we usually focus upon as social scientists. A biological example is Charles Darwin's principle (1859) that any characteristic which increases an organism's chance of survival has a greater probability of being transmitted to the next generation. Such an evolutionary approach is seeing increased attention, particularly from economists.
5 Likewise, some political scientists have shown that organizations change their structure and behavior in response to their environment (Gray and Lowery, 1996) . What the perspectives of complexity theory and evolutionary self-organization tell us is that the ultimate`causes' of certain behaviors can only be understood by studying aggregate-level patterns.
BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 203 4. Although there is an immense literature on fractals, this is unlikely to be a familiar topic. General works include Barnsley (1988) , Kaye (1989) , Mandelbrot (1977 Mandelbrot ( , 1982a Mandelbrot ( , b, 1989a , Schroeder (1991) and Vellupillai (1986) . A few science journals such as Complexity, Fractals and Physica D occasionally publish articles on fractals that have applications to human processes.
5. For examples of evolutionary theory in recent economic thought see Rosser (1992) , Hodgson (1996) and Witt (1996) .
Self-organized Criticality (SOC)
In physical systems there are many`universal regularities' that produce the same pattern no matter what system is examined. One of the most important of these is self-organized criticality or SOC. It was discovered by researchers trying to explain why so many physical patterns repeat in a generic way no matter what the spatial or time scale (Bak et al., 1988; Bak and Tang, 1989; Bak and Chen, 1991; Bak, 1996) . Among many other things, the SOC pattern describes the Richter distribution of earthquakes. In this sort of stochastic fractal, the ratio of the frequency of magnitude 8.0 to the frequency of magnitude 6.0 earthquakes is the same as the ratio of 7.0 to 5.0 earthquakes. Consequently, a time series of earthquakes is dynamically fractal, and so too is the spatial distribution of earthquakes.
6
The equation that de®nes SOC is a law just like other basic relationships in physics: log (F ) Àlog (M ). The log of the frequency of events is a linear function of the log of their magnitudes. This is an inductive generalization similar to the law of gravity. As also is true of that law, the SOC relationship more-or-less applies everywhere, but does not exactly apply anywhere. Such generalizations are common in physics, but not in political science or economics. This is because most mathematically inclined scholars in the social sciences operate from a different paradigm that employs deductive, rather than inductive models (Waldrop, 1992) . As Thomas Kuhn (1962) noted is the nature of scholarly paradigms, until one makes a gestalt shift and views the world from a different perspective, a social scientist will not understand self-organized criticality because SOC is not a familiar sort of model.
In pure self-organized critical systems the same general sort of fractal pattern repeats no matter what the scale. The time series of the price of a volatile stock looks generically the same at hourly, daily, weekly, monthly and yearly intervals (Mandelbrot, 1963 (Mandelbrot, , 1999a . While it is more dif®cult to analyze the behavior of such multifractal series, one can con®dently conclude that a simple time series has been caused by SOC if there is a double log-linear frequency distribution to shifts in its value.
The reason such varied patterns as the frequency of wars, wild®res and time series shifts in stock prices are examples of the same generic sort of fractal pattern is that SOC is a`universal regularity' of the physical sort. The ®rst part of its name is taken from mathematics where seemingly complex processes`self-organize' by naturally evolving into equation systems 204 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 6. Until recently, all the simulation models of SOC closely linked the spatial and temporal aspects of this process, but since most social science time series do not have any obvious spatial aspect, doing so made it dif®cult to translate SOC into a social science context (Brunk, 2000) .
that can be described with a greatly reduced number of parameters. All SOC systems`self-organize' from a multitude of idiosyncratic rules to produce identical fractal patterns as they reach pure SOC. This means that it makes no difference what speci®c physical, economic, biological or other mechanism generates self-organized critical patterns. All systems that produce pure SOC patterns are self-organized critical systems, and their aggregate-level behavior can be described in the same simple way. Therefore, discovering SOC's identifying statistical pattern in historical data tells us something of great importance about how a system's parts interact. Such information cannot be discerned by looking at individual interactions, no matter how intently they are examined because SOC patterns can only be identi®ed in aggregate-level data.
SOC was such a breakthrough in physics that it has demanded a great deal of attention in that discipline, and by now over 500 papers have been published on the process (for bibliographies see Jensen, 1998, and Turcotte, 1999) . Through both computer simulations and intensive examinations of data, physicists have discovered that a multitude of fractal patterns are all caused' by the same nonlinear process. These include such seemingly unrelated things as landslides, avalanches, earthquakes, the background static of AM radios, acoustic emissions from volcanic rocks, solar¯ares, forest ®res, the distribution of galaxies, the meandering pattern of river deltas, sudden¯ashes in luminosity of the glowing radium-coated hands of a 1950s clock, ad in®nitum.
Per Bak was the ®rst researcher to generate SOC patterns using computer simulation techniques. Although he did so in what now is recognized as an overly complicated way, his model of the dynamic evolution of a sandpile remains the most common way to explain SOC behavior. As each new grain of sand is dropped on top of a pile, it tends to ®nd a resting place that does not disturb the others. In other words, the pile self-organizes, and in so doing creates an increasingly complex structure as its height grows. Forty years earlier, George Zipf had recognized that a similar pattern occurs in human systems. He noted many examples of it in Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology (1949). The best known of his examples is that the distribution of the population of cities also is double log-linear. This occurs because such a function minimizes the amount of energy that is needed to create and sustain urban areas.
People, private groups and governments look for the most effective ways to gain their goals. No-one rationally chooses a more costly alternative after a cheaper one has been discovered and proven effective. In this way societies self-organize and evolve. The options that prosper are less costly. Those that only are optimizing in very speci®c niches or in particular historical periods eventually die off. Examples of the latter include the ancient BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 205
Spartan city-state, Native American tribal organizations and the small theocracies of medieval Europe's prince-bishops. In Bak's sandpile, each new grain of sand ®nds a locally easy position to occupy, and this process is analogous to how people enter the work force. In this way a system's complexity is increased. As time passes, an increasing proportion of sand grains and workers become sensitive to the actions of other members of their systems as the non-disruptive locations become occupied. So the structure of sandpiles and economic systems periodically comes to resemble a child's game of pick-up-sticks in reverse. Eventually the grains of sand become so hypersensitive to even the smallest of shocks that dropping another grain causes part of a sandpile ± or, more rarely, the entire pile ± to collapse. The same process occurs in societies. One of SOC's effects can be seen in the rigidities of`mature' economic systems, which so many past authors have cited as the ultimate cause of societal collapse.
Self-organized Criticality in Human Systems
Bak's contribution outside of physics has come from the recent recognition that SOC produces a basic pattern that also is ubiquitous in biological and human systems (Ito, 1995) . The identifying frequency pattern of SOC events used to be called 1/f or¯icker noise (Mandelbrot, 1999b) . This is because until Bak's work was published, physicists were perplexed about the source of the background`noise' that appears in a multitude of diverse situations, such as AM radio static. Most of these`noise' spikes are very small, but some are exceedingly large, being many standard deviations from the bulk of the data.
For the ®rst time, Bak's sandpile model showed why the log of the frequency of occurrence of SOC events is a linear function of the log of their magnitude. This pattern is evident when SOC data are examined as a histogram with both axes in logged values. While this double log-linear pattern exists in many social science data distributions, few of us explicitly noted it because none of us knew of any common statistical process that could produce such an odd distribution. One of the few who did`see' the pattern, but could not precisely de®ne it, was Lewis Richardson (1941) , who tried to model human con¯ict as a chaotic nonlinear process.
While a handful of studies have shown that the characteristic SOC frequency distribution of events occurs in human systems, most of this work has been done by physicists. We have remained blissfully unaware of it since their research has been published in journals that social scientists never encounter. Examples of human systems that have been shown to exhibit SOC include highly volatile stock markets (Feigenbaum and Freund, 1996; Sornette et al., 1996; Sornette and Johansen, 1997) , international 206 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) con¯ict (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998; Turcotte, 1999) , and traf®c jams of various sorts (Nagatani, 1995; Nagel and Paczuski, 1995; Lin et al., 1998) . My conjecture is that SOC exists in all aggregate-level human processes, but this is not self-obvious for two reasons. First, as yet only a few sorts of social science data sets have been examined with the idiosyncratic statistical methods that are useful for identifying such nonlinearities.
7 Second, the paradigmatic ways that we process empirical data usually obscures SOC patterns (e.g. see Brunk, 1989) . These include grouping cases into broad size categories, eliminating extreme events, various transformations to make empirical data conform to a researcher's prior conceptions of the world as a linear environment, and the automatic normalizing that is an inherent ± but largely unrecognized ± characteristic of most common econometric procedures. 
Weak SOC Processes
Since its discovery a decade ago, the persistent problem in applying SOC to social science environments has been that it does not`translate' easily into our contemporary scholarly paradigm. While the formal de®nition of log (F ) Àlog (M ) is straightforward enough, we do not have many laws of this sort. Physicists tried to explain the implications of SOC using their usual method of mental models (Bak's sandpile being the best known) or did so in a more technical way, but in a way that made no sense to us.
According to the standard physics de®nition, a pure SOC system is a dissipative system that consists of a medium with disturbances propagating through it; these disturbances cause a modi®cation of the medium so that it eventually reaches a critical state, after which time the medium is no longer modi®ed (Flyvbjerg, 1996) . At that point any time series of the system's behavior is purely fractal, and so the same generic pattern repeats at all time scales. The reason for this certainly is clear, isn't it? Since Bak's pioneering work, numerous computer simulations have shown that SOC is the natural result of many different sorts of complex interactions that seem on the surface to have nothing in common. As a result, it remained substantively unclear to social scientists why the sort of fractal patterns that SOC generates in sandpile dynamics are universal physical regularities, let BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 207 7. While there is an immense literature on nonlinear methods, almost all of it assumes that time series are chaotic. For some relevant discussions see Brunk (2000 Brunk ( , 2001 , Mandelbrot (1972 Mandelbrot ( , 1988 Mandelbrot ( , 1989b and Peters (1991) .
8. Factor analysis is a good example of such a statistical technique. It turns non-normal input data into more normally distributed factor scores. alone why they should be ubiquitous in human systems. Put differently, no one could reformulate Bak's model using the standard statistical building blocks of social science, and thus produce a mental model that is more applicable to economic, political and social environments. That problem was solved by reconceptualizing SOC in a way that better explains how the process`causes' the patterns of wild®res, and how its complexity cascades are related to the`noise' of time series (Drossel, 1996; Roberts and Turcotte, 1998; Ricotta et al., 1999; Brunk, 2000) .
When social scientists envision the typical pattern of an historical time series, we generally begin by assuming that it is a random walk whose sudden discontinuities are caused by outside shocks. Here, Y t Y t À 1 Z, where Z is a normally distributed random variable consisting of outside shocks. Until recently, such a random walk was the base line way that all human time series were modeled.
The quite plausible reason that social science series have been thought to be random walks is that all of their sudden discontinuities were believed to be caused by outside shocks. Even if these outside shocks are binomial events, just a moderate number per period generates a pattern of normally distributed shifts in a time series. While some shifts in stock prices, electoral support, and con¯ict are so extreme that they cannot be accounted for by the normally distributed white noise of a random walk, in Kuhnian fashion (1962), statistics textbooks told us that extreme observations should be ignored.`Obviously', they must have been generated by a different process than produced the rest of the assumed to be normally distributed observations. Nevertheless, whenever it became possible to accurately measure a very large number of shifts in most historical series, it was apparent that they were not distributed normally. Instead, they form smooth leptokoptic distributions, which have thicker tails and a higher central peak than occur in a normal distribution. The leptokopticity in shifts in stock and commodity prices, exchange rates, political popularity, the number of prey and predators in an ecosystem, ad in®nitum means that such time series have more very small shifts than random walks, and simultaneously have long, thick tails that may contain numerous events many standard deviations from the mean (Mandelbrot, 1963 (Mandelbrot, , 1999a (Mandelbrot, , 1999c .
The pattern of a pure SOC system is a simple fractal walk when a single SOC process is present. It is a multifractal walk if two or more SOC processes generate the value of a time series. Both sorts of fractal walks occur because the basic pattern of the`noise' or shifts in SOC data series are not caused by the size of outside shocks, but by how shocks are transmitted within a system as complexity cascades. Examples include wild®res and V. O. Key's old model of friends-and-neighbors voting (1949) . In such situations the magnitude of a change is not a direct function of the size of its trigger. Throwing a 208 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) larger cigarette out of a car window will not increase the size of the wild®re that it causes. Yelling a derogatory rumor about a politician will not cause it to spread any faster than speaking in a normal voice. Instead, the magnitude of a SOC complexity cascade is a function of the conditions that allow it to spread. At any particular point in time, the potential for spreading a shock within a system is a function of all the past history of that system. SOC processes possess a very long memory, and so`history does make a difference'. Such a perspective on the importance of history to the study of economics and politics stands in stark contrast with the position of most mathematical economists and social choice scholars who view their equilibrium models as so powerful that past history has negligible impact on current behavior.
Simulating Complexity Cascades as a Statistical Process
As soon as Bak discovered that complexity cascades could be generated by the micro-level dynamics of a sandpile, the physicists who were interested in this type of nonlinear dynamical process focused all their attention on collecting empirical examples of SOC data or producing`realistic' simulation models of other SOC systems. As a result, the physics literature contained numerous`realistic' models that simulated the behavior of speci®c SOC systems, but no truly generalizable model. That is ironic because if SOC is ubiquitous, it must be a very simple process which results from the interaction of very common statistical operations.
A number of alternative mental models of SOC now exist, and the most useful of these new descriptions is the wild®re model of SOC. Brunk (2000) developed a simple statistical way to generate complexity cascades, which is a purely temporal version of the wild®re model and does not require any spatial parameters. It makes the source of cascades in historical time series intuitively obvious by uncoupling the mechanism that generates complexity from the one that causes cascades.
As occurs naturally in Bak's sandpile, any wild®re model produces pure SOC if`tuned' to its maximum possible fractality as naturally occurs in some physical systems. Here, log (F ) Àlog (M ) for all size events, and so a time series is fractal at all scales. At the same time, a wild®re model explains why most real world examples of SOC ± in both physical and social science contexts ± are not fractal across their entire range.
9 An eipoc BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 209 9. Examples of this pattern can be seen in numerous articles on SOC, e.g. Brunk (2000) , Jaeger et al. (1989) , Kadanoff et al. (1989) , Manna et al. (1990) , Nagatani (1995) and Tainaka and Itoh (1996). or`ever increasing probability of cascade' processes has only two very simple and commonly encountered component parts (Brunk, 2000) :
Short-run Component: The probability of continuation of a cascade is:
where P proility of continuation of a complexity cascade; N numer of members of a system; n numer of members capable of transmitting a cascade; r numer of members already part of the current cascade. An hypergeometric run proceeds as long as a randomly generated probability P o is less than the model's current hypergeometric probability P. As soon as P o > P, the run ends. The number of members participating in such a statistical run is the magnitude of the complexity cascade.
Long-term Trend: The increase in sensitivity or`complexity' among system members is:
where P t proility of continuation of a complexity cascade just before the beginning of another cascade; P t À 1 proility of continuation of a complexity cascade just after the end of the last cascade; g growth rate, which serves here as a tuning parameter. In such a model, Bak's concept of`complexity' is operationalized as the average sensitivity of a system's component parts to transmitting a shock. The greater the level of such complexity, the closer a system is to a completely critical state, and the greater the likely disruption when a shock occurs. Thus, Bak's critical state becomes a probability that ranges from 0.00 if no cascade can propagate to 1.00 if an entire system will collapse with the next small shock. The nature of a shock in such a system is quite different from that of a random walk, where the effect is a direct and simple function of a shock's magnitude. In a SOC system a minute shock may take down a large portion of a system's members in domino fashion because individuals have become hypersensitive to each other's actions.
As the growth rate ( g) in sensitivity is increased, the degree of jaggedness of an eipoc time series increases. At a very low level of sensitivity growth, a series' variability is so small that its pattern will be overwhelmed by background noise or measurement error. Consequently, the shifts of a very weak SOC time series will appear to be the white noise of a random walk. As the growth rate of sensitivity is increased, the time series becomes increasingly jagged until it becomes purely fractal as pure SOC is reached.
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A priori, one would think that a random walk should be more common in human affairs than such a fractal walk, but a moment's thought probably is enough to convince everyone otherwise. Pure random walks can only occur when no one is affected by anyone else's behavior. Certainly this situation does not describe politics! As soon as anyone's behavior can affect anyone else's actions, we have entered the fractal world of weak SOC. As a system moves toward pure SOC, it becomes more fractal until its jaggedness limits at total self-similarity. Such total self-similarity is re¯ected in the purely double log-linear histogram that relates the log of the frequency of SOC events to the log of their magnitudes as occurs with earthquakes, which are a physical example of complexity cascades that start at the micro-level and become macro-level events.
This previously unexpected set of patterns in historical time series occurs because the two-component processes of pure SOC are both exponentially distributed. In fact, growth in the sensitivity of members of a system to each other's actions and collapses in the form of runs are virtually ubiquitous in human systems. This is a quantitative explanation for why SOC's selfsimilar patterns should be ubiquitous in human history, as well. Historical time series should be more fractal during periods when people are highly sensitive to each other's actions, and less fractal when individuals act in a largely independent fashion.
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The unanticipated characteristic of complexity cascades that clearly separates a fractal walk in another way from a random walk is what happens when a cascade is transmitted through a system. As Tainter (1988: 151) noted,`Thus the paradox of collapse: a drop in complexity brings with it a corresponding rise in the marginal return on social investment'. In a random walk system, only the level of a time series changes when a shock occurs, and nothing happens to the internal structure of a system. When a complexity cascade occurs there is a sudden decrease in the ability of a system's members to transmit cascades at the same time that the value of the time series shifts. Why this occurs can be understood by again intuiting the dynamics of Bak's sandpile. After each collapse a system cannot transmit another cascade within a region that has collapsed until its structure has been rebuilt. It is this mechanism that causes nonlinearities in SOC systems.
An ecological example of such a quasi-cyclical time series is the SOC pattern of wild®res, which is becoming the popular alternative mental model for intuiting the dynamics of complexity cascades (Sinha-Ray and Jensen, 2000) . After each ®re, another great ®re cannot occur until an ecosystem has been rebuilt. The same is true of human systems, as well. When there is a bank run, the bank cannot be run again unless it becomes solvent. When an ideological voting landslide occurs, another landslide cannot occur until the differences between the parties and the voters have been rebuilt. Another physically destructive riot cannot happen in a part of a city that has been burnt to the ground. Another plague cannot occur until the density of individuals capable of transmitting the disease has been re-established. A defeated nation cannot engage in another great war until it has had the time to rearm . . . Seen from the perspective of a wild®re model of SOC, complexity cascades should be exceedingly common in all human affairs.
Historical Patterns
How does this discussion of SOC and eipoc or weak SOC systems help us understand why some societies collapse and all societies experience quasiperiodic oscillations? Since the SOC process comes from a different intellectual paradigm and is dif®cult for some social scientists to intuit, it is best explained through a series of time series simulations. Figures 1, 3 and 4 were generated using 1000 member eipoc systems operating out of tune. Figure 1 is based on a 1,000,000 time period simulation with cascades aggregated to ®ve unit groups (size 1±5, 6±10, etc.). Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of eipoc or weak SOC that can be seen in many historical data distributions. In pure SOC systems there is a strict linear relationship between the log of the frequency of occurrence of events and the log of their size. This means that if one examines a time series of pure SOC events, it is purely fractal because its shifts occur at all magnitude values at a constant ratio. This is equivalent to noting that the sort of function illustrated in Figure 1 is double log-linear across its entire range. Not only does such a generic pattern repeat in a quasi-cyclical way as the system moves through time, but the same pattern repeats at all time scales.
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The generic, but non-deterministic stochastic pattern of a SOC system always repeats in a general way, but never repeats in exactly the same way. In other words, while its general contours can be described, it is not 212 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 11. SOC's self-similar patterns repeat geographically as well as temporally, but the eipoc model removes the spatial aspect of SOC to make the process easier to understand in a time series context. deterministic in its individual events, but is in some sense`random'. Such is the case with all of human history, and offers a conceptual explanation for the`cycles' of international con¯ict, political dominance, etc. As in Figure 1 , the actual pattern of SOC complexity cascades seen in most empirical distributions of social science data is not quite double log-linear. Instead, the lower end of the function curves a little or a lot. The greater the curvature, the further a system is operating out of tune and away from the total fractal patterns of pure SOC.
In the wild®res of ecosystems this curvature occurs because a large number of outside shocks (lightning strikes) repeatedly disrupt the complexity of a system. This takes the system`out of tune' and reduces the number of very large cascades. In the human realm this pattern occurs because governments or private organizations take actions to minimize the effect of SOC complexity cascades by dampening them. Examples of such dampening include the FDIC insurance of American banks, river levies, cartel price agreements and redundant systems in electrical supply grids. From this perspective, the fundamental reason that civilization has advanced is because societies have become more adept in addressing the problems caused by complexity cascades. So doing has allowed more and more societies to achieve longer periods of stability over the last 6000 years. 
International Con¯ict
Lewis Richardson (1941) ®rst noted that the distribution of sizes of wars approximated the function presented in Figure 1 , but he did not possess the necessary analytical tools to understand what this implies. Recently, Roberts and Turcotte (1998) , two geophysicists from Cornell University, analyzed the Levy (1983) and Small and Singer (1982) data sets on wars.
To compensate for the small number of wars that have occurred as compared to the 100,000s of observations that often are available for studies of SOC in the physical sciences, they computed an average value for each ®ve adjacent data points. Roberts and Turcotte then applied the rule of thumb of plotting the resulting function ± a histogram with both axes in logged values ± as double-log linear until the lower tail tapers off. While this is an unfamiliar statistical heuristic in the social sciences, it is standard in the physics and other technical literatures on nonlinear dynamics. The in¯ection point indicates the level below which there is no conclusive evidence that a system is behaving in a fractal way. The double-log slope for the Levy data is À1:28 for the largest 61 percent of con¯icts. The smallest 15 percent of wars did not appear to be SOC complexity cascades, and it was not obvious whether the intermediate 24 percent were SOC events. The Singer and Small data have a slope of À1:40 for the largest 77 percent of wars, with the smallest 23 percent apparently not resulting from SOC. Roberts and Turcotte's (1998: 357) conclusion was quite forceful:`The results we have shown indicate that world order behaves as a self-organized critical system independent of the efforts made to control and stabilize interactions between people and countries'; and wars, like forest ®res, are SOC processes.
At this point it is important to note another characteristic of SOC systems that muddle the usual social science rules for empirical analysis. The slope of a SOC function is invariant with changes in the size of a system (see Brunk, 2000: 432, Figure 2 ). This means that if a researcher transforms raw data to re¯ect a preconceived notion of how it should be distributed, this massaging may introduce a systematic error that destroys the SOC pattern.
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Both of the datasets analyzed by Roberts and Turcotte are examples of data that were massaged in a way that produced unanticipated, systematic 214 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 12. Two examples are noteworthy and common. Public opinion polling data often are recomputed to make popularity time series have normally distributed shifts because they are`supposed' to have normally distributed shifts. Recognizing that such data have been massaged explains why political popularity seems to be a random walk, but electoral data are fractal (Brunk, 2001) . In a similar fashion, a large proportion of the data points in many economic history series are not real. They were generated by assuming such series grow exponentially, and the unmeasured points are exponential interpolations.
error. Rather than using raw data on the number of deaths as a measure of intensity, Levy (1983) `corrected' his data by de®ning intensity as the ratio of battle deaths to European population. In somewhat similar fashion, Small and Singer (1982) de®ned war intensity as a ratio of battle deaths to the population of the warring states. As a result, a function estimated on such data might well curve in its smaller values because of this distortion, rather than because the international system does not operate as a SOC system in low intensity con¯icts.
The type of techniques used by Roberts and Turcotte are applied here to the larger sample of estimated war deaths presented by Carrere (1976, 1978) . 13 That dataset was analyzed in a very highly aggregated way by Brunk (2001) to crudely suggest, as well, that wars are an example of SOC. The evidence presented in Figure 2 is consistent with the belief that the occurrence of medium size wars is caused by almost pure SOC. Only one data point, the number of wars of approximately 1000 deaths, had to be deleted for the SOC function to become almost perfectly linear (r 0:98). This means that the time series of armed con¯ict is a fractal for wars of greater than 1000 deaths. In other words, while nations may have some control over the level of con¯ict in the international system, if a small con¯ict escalates, it can quickly spin out of control in a way that cannot be predicted. The First World War is a good example of this phenomenon.
As is probably obvious by now, virtually all the concepts and techniques of nonlinear dynamics are unfamiliar to those of us who were taught statistics from the linear regression paradigm. Another of these new concepts is the idea of fractal dimension, which in a time series context is a measure of the jaggedness of a line. A random walk is a time series generated by white or normally distributed noise, which completely`®lls up' the available space, and has a fractal dimension of 2.00. A fractional fractal dimension greater than 1.00 indicates that a time series is generated by a nonlinear dynamical process, and thus provides a`new' way for social scientists to establish the nature of historical causation.
A practical way to describe the jaggedness of time series was developed by Hurst (1951) . His H is the inverse of the fractal dimension, and has these relevant values: H 0:50 implies randomness. 0:50 < H < 1:00 means that a time series experiences trends and pseudo-cycles. As with the data of Figure 2 , H can be estimated as the negative inverse of the slope of the linear portion of a SOC function (Roberts and Turcotte, 1998 In other words, despite the major differences in the ways that these social science data sets measure the intensity of wars, the analyses of all three of them produce almost identical H values. Clearly, the level of international con¯ict is not a random walk, and at least for medium size wars of between 1000 and 150,000 deaths, the international system operates as an almost pure SOC system. To reiterate why this conclusion is clear from such an empirical analysis, the only generic process that produces purely self-similar patterns in time series data is SOC.
Wars provide an excellent example of how SOC operates in the human realm. For a long time scholars have intuited that the micro-level behavior of people affects macro-level patterns (e.g. Schelling, 1978; Kaufmann, 1992) , but were perplexed about exactly how. Any system that exhibits the characteristic fractal pattern of self-organized critical behaves as a SOC 216 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) system, and so the individual motivations of participants in a SOC system are irrelevant to its macro-level patterns. Historically, nations may rationally have decided to engage in war, a la Bueno de Mosquita (1981), or they may just have blundered into con¯ict. Somehow the international system self-organized itself into a SOC system. Unless the fundamental rules that govern the behavior of such a system change, it is only a matter of time before a catastrophic war destroys any given nation-state. What the historical data analyzed here do not address are the impacts of such recent innovations as nuclear weapons and arms limitation treaties on large wars. Historians often look at long periods of peace as times when the usual pattern of con¯ict was suppressed by a hegemonic power, such as ancient Rome or the contemporary United States.
14 Because estimating SOC functions requires the aggregation of a relatively large number of wars of various magnitudes, there is not enough empirical data on wars to directly examine these patterns. So this sort of issue will need to be addressed using such methods as computer simulation.
Multifractal Time Series
There probably are many other examples of almost pure SOC processes of the one-tailed sort that have not been much dampened by human efforts, but so few social science data series have been examined from a SOC perspective that this conjecture is largely untested. 15 The existence of two-tailed time series that seem to be generated by SOC are far more obvious. In social science data these can be seen as multifractal time series whose discontinuities are produced by crash and upcrash events. Such processes include stock prices and the popularity of political parties in multi-party systems (Feigenbaum and Freund, 1996; Sornette et al., 1996; Sornette and Johansen, 1997; Mandelbrot, 1999a; Brunk, 2001) .
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14. From a SOC perspective a la Per Bak, a permanent period of relative peace can be conceptualized as moving the nation-state system from the mountains to the plains. Only more research will tell if this is an apt analogy.
15. I have a request of readers. For a decade I have been trying to ®nd data sets of historical events that are suitable for testing the SOC thesis. Unfortunately, the relevant characteristics of many potentially useful time series have been destroyed by aggregation of cases because the government agencies who collect data have seen no reason to publish information on individual events. If you know of any data sets that provide the individual characteristics (size, duration, etc.) of a large number of discrete events (riots, etc.), I would greatly appreciate knowing about them. While I suspect numerous data sets of this sort exist, there is no obvious way to locate them, and so my principal source has been serendipity. Benoit Mandelbrot (1963) noted these patterns long ago, but was not able to provide a simple reason for their ubiquity in human affairs. As he recently wrote,`Multifractals are found throughout physics, but to assume universal regularities in the economic fundamentals would be far-fetched. The next thought, that the complex interactions in ®nancial markets end up by creating some, seems far more likely' (Mandelbrot, 1999c: 486) . Since chaotic explanations of economic time series have not been notably successful, it appears that the essence of these`complex interactions' probably results from the`universal regularity' of SOC. Figure 3 presents an example of a multifractal time series of the sort common in economic contexts. It was generated from two separate eipoc or weak SOC series, one for bullish and one for bearish sentiment, both having g 2:20. Shocks were transmitted as complexity cascades among the members of a 1000 person market over 50,000 time periods and are illustrated at 100 period intervals. A bullish shock increased the price of a stock by the number of participants in a cascade. A bearish shock reduced the price in like fashion. By de®nition, such a series is a multifractal since it is the sum of two fractal walks.
The shifts of such multifractal series are leptokoptic. This means that they are more peaked than a normal distribution and have fatter tails. Upon close inspection, such leptokopticity characterizes most time series, but many historical series do not have as great a level of leptokopticity as occurs in Figure 3 Intuitively, the reason for such`universal regularities' in historical patterns can be understood by again examining the dynamics of Bak's sandpile. It experiences quasi-periodic oscillations because each new sand grain builds the pile's complexity and thus its height. A pile's height grows very slowly, and it does not decline until a part of the pile reaches a critical state, at which point it suddenly collapses and its degree of complexity declines precipitously. A similarly large collapse cannot occur again in that area of the pile until the region's complexity has been rebuilt.
When this pattern was discovered, physicists suddenly realized they had been focusing on the wrong sorts of questions. As is typical in the social sciences, as well, most researchers spend their careers intently studying speci®c events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, or a restricted category of events, like armed con¯icts. Our belief has been that such a strategy eventually will produce an additive set of rules that describes the total behavior of human systems. What the discovery of SOC demonstrates is that such a research strategy has not been the right one. A holistic approach sometimes is needed because some processes only emerge at the system level. SOC is a prime example. Like Darwin's principle of natural selection, such processes cannot be discovered by examining individual events, no matter how intently they are studied.
Sustaining a Society's Complexity
Human systems are naturally self-organizing in that societies always tend to evolve toward the maximum level of complexity that is possible given current technological constraints. As they approach this limit, they experience increasingly rigidities and suffer more problems of various sorts. Unless societies can evolve and innovate out of this plight, eventually they no longer have enough resources to address their problems (Olson, 1982; Tainter, 1995) . Then they may collapse from what would have been an insigni®cant event in any other circumstances. Tainter (1988: 178±89) provides a particularly interesting example of what can happen to a society that unknowingly faces a major self-organizing criticality situation. Ironically, it points out that keeping the Golden Rule's admonition of`Do onto others as you would have done onto yourself ' is not always survival maximizing advice. The Chacoans of New Mexico devised elaborate irrigation and grain storage systems to protect themselves from drought. Having constructed such a safety net, they felt secure from starvation and allowed the more marginal communities at their geographical periphery to join their collective sustenance system. This goodwill had the unanticipated effect of putting their society under greater stress when a severe drought ®nally arrived. What would have been an endurable crisis BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 219 in the 12th century if the Chacoan society had been smaller, destroyed it. This was because the Chacoans no longer had the¯exibility needed to address the complexity cascade caused by a severe drought. As economic theorists have noted, a`mature' society is one that has become so rigid it suffers numerous partial, quasi-periodic small collapses, and may even suffer a total collapse. A SOC perspective tells us that such rigidities are not just a characteristic of the`mature' societies that Mancur Olson so intently discussed. All societies are subject to various sorts of quasi-cyclical`rigidities', and societal collapses are just the most spectacular of SOC's complexity cascades.
It is useful to keep in mind in describing such societal evolution that complexity' has a quite different meaning from`innovation' or`progress'. A society becomes more`complex' in the SOC sense as the actions of its members increasingly affect the behavior of other members. Civilization is advanced through`innovation' or`progress', which measure a society's ability to control the negative effects of complexity cascades.
Unlike the non-sentient components of physical systems, humans have the ability to manipulate the rules of the game and the structure of their systems. The result is an evolving type of long-run societal self-organization where humans constantly are experimenting with rules and institutional structures to see what works best. The options that produce the greatest growth and stability in particular periods and speci®c niches are kept, while those that produce rapid collapses are discarded (Axelrod, 1984; Schaffer, 1989; Brunk et al., 1996; Gray and Lowery, 1996) .
What links all SOC-like systems at the most general level in both young and mature societies is their two very commonly encountered component processes. These are growth in the sensitivity of a system's members to each other's behavior and cascades in the form of hypergeometric runs like the falling of a row of dominoes. The further a SOC system is taken out of tune by human efforts, the more curved the lower end of the function illustrated in Figure 1 becomes. This curvature causes its fractal patterns to disappear in shorter time and spatial ranges. That effect can be seen by scanning a few dozen plots of stock prices. Highly volatile price series remain fractal in the smallest measurable time increments, while the pattern of a less volatile price series only repeats monthly or yearly.
Such changes in fractality and the dynamical behavior of a weak SOC system are achieved in an eipoc simulation by changing the growth rate of sensitivity of individuals to each other's behavior. Equivalently, it can be achieved by modifying the frequency of exogenous shocks to a system. As outside shocks become more frequent, the self-organization principle of SOC systems is disrupted, which decreases the number of very large collapses. As the proportion of exogenous shocks increases, more complexity cascades are triggered prematurely. This means a system does not maintain its double 220 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) log-linear pattern of cascades over a broad range, but neither does it suffer great rigidities because it never evolves to a`mature' state.
There is yet a third way that the behavior of SOC-like systems can be changed. Their variability can be reduced by dampening, which is how SOC often is controlled in human systems. Such dampening takes the form of FDIC insurance on American bank deposits to lessen the potential for bank runs, changes in the level of the prime interest rate to prevent the economy from overheating, periodic elections to release pent-up political frustration, river levies to control disastrous¯oods, military failsafe recall procedures to reduce the chance of war and a multitude of other manmade contrivances.
SOC-like systems whose shocks are somehow dampened do not as often reach a level of great sensitivity. While such systems always are moving toward pure SOC, they rarely reach this state because their degree of complexity remains low. This reduces the chance that very large cascades will occur. In large part, the advancement of civilization has been achieved because societies have discovered more and more ways to dampen complexity cascades and avoid their negative consequences. Figure 4 shows the pattern of complexity cascades that occur in human systems with different growth rates of complexity. While complexity has many different operationalizations, in a SOC context it is a measure of the inter-dependence of a system's component parts in terms of their ability to transmit complexity cascades. These four simulations present the dynamical history of a system of 1000 members over 20,000 time periods; and the level of complexity is illustrated at 100 period intervals. In Figure 4A , the rate of complexity growth is roughly 60 percent of the rate that generates pure SOC fractal patterns. Here the evolving system always remains stable. Such a society only experiences very small setbacks, and nothing at all catastrophic.
Rate of Complexity Growth
In other words, with moderation comes stability. However, the growth of a slowly evolving society is far less than its potential, and such a strategy cannot be afforded by most nations. As Tainter (1988: 201) put it,`In competitive . . . situations the option (of ) . . . a lower level . . . is an invitation to be dominated . . .'. This insight explains why only strongly hegemonic societies, such as the Roman Empire, and small groups of equally advanced states, like those of Mycenaean Greece, had available the rational option of collapsing to a lower level of complexity. Like the philosophy of paci®sm, choosing the paths of collapse or slow growth are not survival maximizing strategies for competing societies. This is why the history of Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire has been ®lled with armed con¯ict.
Unlike the case with non-sentient physical systems that cannot evolve technologically, societies with marginally higher growth rates of complexity often innovate quicker. This gives them an edge over their competitors, and makes it easier for them to control the adverse effect of complexity cascades. What they must weigh are the innovation bene®ts of increased complexity growth against the increased chance of experiencing a large cascade that comes with greater complexity. An example of such a plight was China's unsuccessful strategy of maintaining traditional values vis-a-vis the western colonial powers during the Ching dynasty. In contrast, Meiji Japan chose a quicker evolutionary path, and while it was spectacularly successful in the Russo±Japanese War, it suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Second World War.
At the slightly greater level of complexity growth of Figure 4B , our simulated society advances faster, but at the 9000th time period suffered a major setback and its level of complexity declined to 75 percent of what it had been. Then at the 18,000 time period the system totally collapsed. In both cases it just got unlucky. There was nothing different about the processes of societal evolution during the stable periods and the catastrophic interludes, and so to look for clear cause-and-effect relationships in SOC environments is an intellectual mistake.
As Figures 4C and 4D show, increasing in two steps to approximately 75 percent of a society's growth potential increases both the number of major setbacks and total collapses. Unless highly ef®cient dampening procedures are evolved, the societies that operate at these higher levels of complexity growth are far more unstable. They suffer periodic partial collapses, such as the Great Depression, and even total extinctions. Not only will there be some spontaneous internal collapses as occurred with the demise of the Soviet Union, but if competing societies are operating at such high levels, there will be long periods of war and numerous societies will be ravaged.
Discussion
If people always behaved like such physical entities as sand grains, we could never hope to evolve out of our collective dilemmas. Like fragile ecosystems, our societies would exist at the edge of chaos in a constant state of SOC, experience repeated crashes and the level of human progress could never be very great. Through trial and error experimentation over the last 6000 years, we have stumbled upon various means to control the negative consequences of complexity cascades. In this way the ancient pattern of dynasties surviving for only a few generations has been replaced by long-lasting nationstates and economies that have become increasingly stable and international in scale.
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While it may not be possible to eliminate the`universal regularities' caused by SOC, we can reduce their effects. Seen in this light, such an interpretation of why societies collapse is an optimistic one. Given a ®xed number of types of possible catastrophes, each can be made less likely through careful planning or by trial and error experimentation. Furthermore, some of the quasi-periodic oscillations caused by SOC make little difference to societal stability. An example is the price of an unimportant commodity that can be allowed to gyrate wildly, but other commodities, like petroleum, are so crucial that the sustainability of modern societies depends on their stable supply and stable price. In such cases, governments will take all sorts of actions to dampen their¯uctuations, including rationing, price controls, and most recently the formation of a multinational coalition to ®ght Iraq in the Persian Gulf War.
Since no one has recognized that a fractal pattern describes the frequency of societal and semi-societal collapses, we have not explicitly considered how best to modify their quasi-cyclical patterns. Perhaps a less costly alternative than the standard one of dampening cascades after they begin would be to change the basic rules of human systems to make cascades less likely.
A Never Ending Succession of Disasters?
A crucial question remains. In Olson-like fashion, do societies always tend to self-organize in a way that creates a greater number and variety of potential catastrophes as they mature? This would explain why no society lasts for ever. A plausible non-economic example of such endemic self-organization is the contemporary overuse of antibiotics, which makes future plagues more likely. Such biological catastrophes have decimated many societies in the past (McNeill, 1976) . Long before the discovery of SOC, some writers argued that modern societies with their many interconnections and specialized subsystems are inherently unstable (Flannery, 1972) . Rappaport (1977: 65) , for example, noted that`Civilization has emerged only recently ± in the past six thousand or so years ± and may yet prove to be an unsuccessful experiment'.
Ironically, instead of eliminating all complexity cascades, what the increasing bureaucratization of mature societies may do is increase the impact of the really big cascades when they overwhelm a society's barricades. Such an interpretation allows the varied hypotheses about why societies collapse to become consistent with a more encompassing`theory of history' that is based on SOC. A recent example of the unintentional magni®cation of complexity cascades through well-intended bureaucratic behavior is the wild®res that have swept the American West. Their sizes were greatly increased by the US Forest Service's long-standing policy of immediately extinguishing ®res. 224 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) By not allowing small wild®res to burn freely every few years, the complexity of the western forest systems was greatly increased in terms of the ability of wild®res to spread, and so too was the magnitude of the inevitable disasters that occurred at the turn of the millennium. Numerous writers on the collapse of societies have noted that`mature' states eventually ®nd that the spiraling costs of constraining the increasing number of complexity cascades they face becomes prohibitive. In such cases, people may rationally choose to live in a less complex environment. This is what happened toward the end of the Western Roman Empire when its frontier inhabitants welcomed the barbarians, who did not impose as heavy a tax burden as did Roman provincial authorities. Nevertheless, if all societies are being drawn toward the edge of chaos, there is no absolute solution to the problem of collapse. Even temporarily reducing a society's level of complexity will not permanently rid its inhabitants of the evils of periodic cascades. This is because human systems are constantly self-organizing toward a greater level of complexity, which brings with it unanticipated problems. In so doing they all seem to follow the same generic evolutionary path of expansion and sudden setbacks.
Who would have thought only a few years ago that the California economic boom and that state's deregulation of electricity would havè caused' rolling power blackouts? That is the nature of SOC problems. They are unanticipated and catch people by surprise. Complexity cascades appear to be a plight that all societies must endure. While we can make certain types of cascades less likely, we cannot altogether eliminate them. In fact, by reducing the probability of some sorts of cascades, we inadvertently increase the likelihood of others. This is why there can be no`end to history'.
The stock market crash of 1929, the Great Chicago ®re, the Irish potato famine and most other sorts of unanticipated aggregate-level events seem to be of the SOC sort. SOC also`explains' such diverse events as quick border wars, the Mexican Revolution, the First World War, the Los Angeles riots that erupted after the Rodney King verdict and the unexpected civil war that engulfed the`Friendly Islands' of Tonga for two generations after their discovery by Captain Cook, who named them for the unusual peacefulness of their inhabitants. It`explains', as well, the total disappearance of such societies as the people of Easter Island. Given enough time, a few exceedingly catastrophic and unpredictable events always occur in any system much affected by SOC.
Avenues for Future Research
SOC provides a revolutionary new way to interpret human history, but doing BRUNK: WHY DO SOCIETIES COLLAPSE? 225 so demands that we change our basic view about cause-and-effect relationships. The SOC perspective tells us why the aggregate-level political, economic and social events that we have believed could be forecast with great precision are actually`random' events of a new sort. Like an earthquake, neither the timing, nor the size of a SOC event can be predicted with much precision. To better understand the empirical limits that SOC imposes on forecasting, we will need to become more familiar with the concepts of fractal mathematics and the statistical methods of nonlinear dynamics. The usefulness of SOC as the basic model that explains the macro-level patterns of a multitude of physical systems has been debated in the physical sciences for a decade. During this time alternative models have been proposed for many physical systems, but none of the alternatives is as generic or as intuitively plausible as SOC. Put simply, SOC simultaneously offers answers to a number of scholarly puzzles that other explanations can only address in idiosyncratic or limited ways. As a result, SOC is`winning' the scholarly debate in the physical sciences. A similar intellectual debate probably will occur in the social sciences during the next decade.
The recently developed wild®re model of weak SOC is particularly appropriate for understanding social science environments. In this sense it provides a new`theory of history'. It seems to be the generic model of aggregate-level human behavior that historians and social scientists have long sought to discover. What is needed to test this conjecture is more empirical research. I hope that this article will stimulate such work.
